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Economists have long struggled to explain vastly di®ering growth patterns of countries start-
ing out from apparently very similar initial conditions. Models of complementarities in in-
vestment decisions have featured prominently in the literature.1 In the presence of such
complementarities, multiple equilibria can emerge and two identical economies can end up
at very di®erent levels of development.
Though models with multiple equilibria can in principle account for the various observed
development outcomes they are considered somewhat unsatisfactory as they lack predictive
power. Moreover, so far no satisfying theory exists to explain the transition from one equi-
librium to another. Thus often 'brute force' direct state controlled coordination has been
suggested to be the appropriate policy.
We use recent theoretical developments in equilibrium selection and suggest a more subtle
mechanism to change the equilibrium { information policy. Introduced by Carlsson and van
Damme (1993) and further extended by Morris and Shin (1998) the theory of Global Games
ties equilibrium selection to initial informational conditions. Those informational conditions
can in principle be in°uenced, e.g. by the government or international organizations, and
thus the arising equilibrium can be ascertained. We show how an appropriate information
policy enhances e±ciency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may
be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information
provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information
The industrialization of an economy is widely considered as central for its lasting devel-
opment. All now developed countries went through a phase of industrialization at one point
in their history. The UK did so in the early 19th century, the US, Germany and France in
the second part of the 19th century. And the Asian Countries industrialized before - as in
the case of Japan - or after WWII like South Korea, Singapore or Taiwan. But apparently
not all countries manage to enter this process and so initially similar countries take very
di®erent courses of development. Whereas industrialized economies tend to grow faster and
1Cf. Basu and Nayak (1992) or Ray (1998).
1more sustainable, the non-industrialized economies lag behind. Therefore it is often argued
that industrializing countries is an integral part of a good development policy.
Why there are some countries that manage to industrialize while there are at the same
time apparently similar countries that fail to do so has often been explained by the presence
of multiple equilibria. In pioneering work Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued that industrial-
izing a country only works if many sectors at once are industrialized as one industrialized
sector alone would not be able to operate pro¯tably. Hence he argued for a 'Big Push' in
development policy. The essence of Rosenstein-Rodan's argument is that one ¯rm's decision
to invest in industrializing a sector has positive e®ects on other ¯rms' pro¯ts from invest-
ing in industrializing other sectors. Using game theoretic language, investors' decisions are
strategic complements, i.e. one investor's expected pro¯t increases in the other's decision
to invest. Consequently there are multiple equilibria: If nobody invests it is optimal not to
invest either. If everybody else invests it is optimal to invest as well. So the observation
that some countries did not industrialize can be explained by a failure to coordinate.
Several authors have formalized this argument, e.g. Faini (1984), Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1989), Matsuyama (1991), Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996), or Trindade (2005), and
set out the conditions under which multiple equilibria can arise, i.e. what the nature of
these strategic complementarities driving this result has to be2. We use these papers as a
starting point and assume that there exist strategic complementarities in ¯rms' investment
decisions. However, we go beyond the existing literature along two dimensions and use the
Global Games approach to solve the aforementioned coordination problem.3
Our ¯rst novel assumption is that the pro¯tability of a ¯rm's investment does not only
depend on the number of other ¯rms investing. In general it will be the case that the
pro¯tability of an investment in a country depends on many other factors like the political
2Models with multiple equilibria are notoriously hard to test empirically. However, Graham and Temple
(2001) lend credibility to their explanatory power. They calibrate a numerical model with multiple equilibria
and argue that for a number of countries, e.g. Honduras, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico,
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia, an equilibrium change story plausibly allows to
interpret their growth pattern.
3Karayalcin and Mitra (1999) analyze a dynamic learning model to select one of the two equilibria.
2stability of the country, its degree of openness, the quality of contract enforcement or pre-
existing infrastructure. We assume that these factors can be summarized in one variable,
the country's investment environment.
These states can be ordered such that there exist three distinct categories of countries:
Countries where there are so many obstacles to investment that investing never pays even if
all ¯rms would manage to coordinate on investing. For these countries there exists a unique
equilibrium in which nobody invests. Think of areas with long lasting political unrest or
even civil wars like many states in Sub Saharan Africa.
Countries where in contrast an investment pays o® even if nobody else is going to invest.
Therefore, here the unique equilibrium has everybody investing. Examples could be the
former Eastern Bloc states of Eastern Europe with a well trained labor force and e®ective
institutions as for example the Czech Republic.
Finally countries characterized by mediocre investment environments where the above
discussed problem of multiple equilibria persists, as there the number of others investing
determines whether or not an investment is worthwhile. Presumably a large fraction of
countries lies in that intermediate region and is therefore plagued by a coordination problem.
Our second novel assumption is that we introduce private information. Although there
may be a lot of publicly observable data concerning a country's investment environment,
potential investors are likely to interpret these observed facts in a slightly di®erent man-
ner. Think of the di®erent ¯rms' research departments producing country reports. Another
interpretation is that a potential investor requesting information from a country never can
be sure whether he gets the same information as other potential investors. That is, ¯rms
receive private signals over a country's quality.
Summing up, our set-up has the following features: 1) The payo® of ¯rms' actions depends
on an underlying variable, i.e. the country's investment environment. 2) The ¯rms hold
private information about the true state of a country. 3) The players' actions are strategic
complements, and for some intermediate states there exists a coordination problem. These
features make our set-up suitable to apply the techniques of the Global Games Approach,
3which was pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and further extended by Morris
and Shin (1998), and to eliminate multiple equilibria. It has the additional attractive feature
that it opens the scope for an interesting policy tool to mitigate the coordination problem -
the provision of information. Like Morris and Shin (1998) most applications of the Global
Games Approach are set in ¯nancial markets or currency crises models. To the best of our
knowledge our paper is the ¯rst to use this approach in a development context.
The following reasoning helps to grasp the basic intuition of the Global Games Approach.
Start from the insight that the basic problem in coordination problems is the Knightian
nature of the strategic uncertainty, i.e. players cannot assign probabilities to di®erent events
(here other players' actions). Conventional game theory deals with this problem by only
analyzing equilibrium behavior, where there is no problem as players' actions are perfectly
correlated. Introducing private information renders common knowledge infeasible and turns
the Knightian uncertainty into Bayesian uncertainty and so agents can form expectations
over gains and losses from their actions. So we get an additional equilibrium constraint that
allows us to eliminate multiple equilibria and end up with a unique equilibrium prediction.
Morris and Shin (1998) show for coordination problems like the one at hand that it is
possible to derive a unique threshold for a ¯rm's belief about the value of the underlying
variable (in our model the country's investment environment), which determines whether
or not it takes a speci¯c action. This threshold in turn depends on the ¯rm's private
information. For our model that says that if and only if a ¯rm believes the country's
investment environment to be better than this threshold it is going to invest. If it receives a
signal that the environment is worse than this threshold it does not invest. Therefore there
is no longer a problem of multiple equilibria.
While that might have some appeal from a theoretical point of view { as we now can
uniquely pin down the equilibrium of the game { it does not help too much in terms of
providing policy advice. In general the threshold for the signal will be somewhere within
the region of countries with intermediate investment environments. That is there are some
countries where the (now unique) equilibrium has no ¯rm investing, although investment
would be e±cient as long as coordination is ensured.
4Fortunately, the Global Games Approach allows us to do more than just equilibrium
re¯nements. An 'appropriate' information policy can reduce the ine±ciency arising from a
too high threshold. 'Appropriate' here means simply more precise. By providing ¯rms with
a more accurate signal about the true investment environment the equilibrium threshold
can be shifted and e±ciency enhanced. So while e.g. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)
suggested subsidizing investments in order to overcome the coordination problem, we now
o®er another way to deal with the problem. Providing information in the right way achieves
a more e±cient allocation.
Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005) report that among all the former Eastern Block
states those that were about to enter the European Union were by far the most successful
in attracting investments and experienced the strongest growth. One can interpret this
in the light of our model. In the process of entering the European Union those countries
have to implement several system changes which make the information structure a lot more
transparent. This might have changed the threshold su±ciently to ensure coordination on
the desired equilibrium.
A natural question to ask is who should provide this information. An obvious answer is
'the country's government'. However, one might argue that governments have misguided
incentives in this context. Several reasons come to mind why they may prefer to have
their country industrialized (even if this is not e±cient): An optimistic view might imply
benevolent motives towards its citizens. A more pessimistic view might imply that it is
simply easier to collect bribes or other perks from industry ¯rms. So a credibility problem
in information provision arises.
One way to cope with that would be to transfer the provision of information to inter-
mediaries that do not have a direct interest in the outcome. Private rating agencies or
international bodies like the Worldbank or the IMF could serve this purpose. Another solu-
tion would be to ¯nd ways for the government to credibly signal the country's true quality.
In this context there may again be some scope for subsidies but now with a quite di®erent
notion than in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). Here the government does not take
away the ¯nancial risk of a coordination failure from the ¯rm but subsidies emerge as an
5equilibrium property of a signalling game. If it is easier for a country with a good investment
environment to recoup subsidies, e.g. by taxing ¯rms' pro¯ts, than for a country with a more
di±cult investment environment, subsidies are a less costly signal for such a high quality
country. These di®ering signalling costs allow for a separating equilibrium. That is subsidies
might be a second best policy instrument.
Though with a slightly di®erent focus, Rodrik, Grossman, and Norman (1995) describe
the development success stories of South Korea and Taiwan. They argue that in both
countries the main source of growth was, as in our model, an investment boom and that the
boom started after a coordination failure was overcome. They point out the crucial role of
subsidies to achieve this by directing investment to the desired destinations. Another key
feature for the development success pointed out by Rodrik, Grossman, and Norman (1995) is
improvement of the 'investment climate'. This matches neatly to the investment environment
variable we use and again points at a speci¯c role for development policy: Improving the
investment environment, i.e. creating political stability, improving the enforceability of
contracts, etc., opens up the possibility for those economies to become industrialized and
thus develop faster.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the assumptions
and sets out the basic model. In Section 3 we deal with the problem of multiple equilibria and
derive the unique equilibrium threshold. Section 4 analyzes the scope for e±ciency enhancing
informational policy. In Section 5 we discuss extensions of the model. We conclude in Section
6. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of ¯rms with mass 1. Each ¯rm can decide whether to invest in one
sector of a non{industrialized country or not. If one ¯rm invests in a sector this sector is
called industrialized. Following the reasoning of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) we
assume that ¯rms then are monopolists in their respective sectors and thus can earn positive
pro¯ts. We assume there are no coordination problems among ¯rms in what sector to invest.
6Relaxing this assumption would considerably complicate the analysis without contributing
to a better understanding of the problem.
Each ¯rm i's pro¯t ¼ depends on the share ®¡i of other ¯rms investing in the country. Each
¯rm has to bear costs C(z) of investing. These costs depend on the investment environment
z in a country. We think of the investment environment in very broad terms and subsume
basically all factors which are important for successful investment in it, e.g. institutional
features like political stability, quality of contract enforcement, or security of property rights.
But also the existing infrastructure and the stock of human capital could be subsumed in it.
z is uniformly distributed between z and z, where z describes a very favorable investment
environment with only little obstacles to overcome whereas z describes an extremely adverse
investment environment. It is in principle possible to allow for more general informational
structures4. However, to ease the exposition we stick to this simple setting.
Therefore the pro¯t of an investing ¯rm is given by
¦ = ¼(®) ¡ C(z); (1)
with @¼
@® > 0, @C
@z > 0 and @2C
@z2 > 0.
@¼
@® > 0 captures the fact that ¯rms' investment decisions are strategic complements. The
costs are convex in z, capturing the idea that it gets harder and harder to pro¯tably invest
in a country when the investment environment becomes more di±cult. If the ¯rm does not
invest its pro¯t is normalized to 0.
We impose two additional assumptions:
9¸ z < z s:t: ¼(1) < C(z) 8z ¸ ¸ z: (2)
There exists a threshold such that for every value of z above ¸ z it does not pay for a ¯rm
to invest because the investment environment is so bad that it would make losses even if all
other ¯rms would invest. Therefore it is a dominant strategy not to invest in this region.
9^ z > z s:t: ¼(0) > C(z) 8z · ^ z: (3)
4See e.g. Morris and Shin (2003).
7However, if the investment environment is very favorable, i.e. z is below ^ z; it pays for a ¯rm
to invest even if it is the only one to do so. It is therefore a dominant strategy to invest.
To make the problem interesting assume ¸ z > ^ z. Now we have two regions with dominant
strategies at the extremes of the support of z and only for the intermediate region z 2 [^ z; ¸ z]
the initial coordination problem persists. Henceforth we will call the regions below ^ z and
above ¸ z the 'dominance regions'. If there is common knowledge on the true quality of the
country we have two equilibria in this region where either all ¯rms invest or no ¯rm invests.
^ z ¸ z z z
Figure I
Now we introduce private information. Each ¯rm i knows the support and distribution
from which the realization of z is drawn but receives only a noisy signal zi of the true value
of z. These signals are only privately observed.
The signal zi is uniformly distributed between [z ¡ ²;z + ²]5. All private signals are
independent. Furthermore it is common knowledge that every ¯rm receives such a private
signal. It is possible to allow for heterogeneity among ¯rms with respect to the quality of
the private signals, i.e. have better or less well informed ¯rms. To ease exposition we focus
on the case with symmetric information.
Each ¯rm can now decide dependent on zi whether or not to invest or whether to play
a mixed strategy over the two alternatives. The strategy of ¯rm i is therefore a function
si(zi) : [z;z] ! [0;1].
This completes the description of the game. We turn now to the analysis of the equilibrium.
5This modelling is based on Morris and Shin (1998). Again richer information structures are possible.
See e.g. Morris and Shin (2003).
83 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
There exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the game with private information. In
this equilibrium ¯rms invest if and only if their signal is below a threshold z?. To show
this, we ¯rst assume that every ¯rm follows a simple switching strategy and invests if and
only if it receives a signal below a threshold k. By continuity arguments it is easy to show
that indeed such a simple switching strategy is optimal, i.e. imposing it in the ¯rst place is
without loss of generality. Assuming that everybody else uses such a switching strategy we
calculate expected pro¯ts of investing or not investing conditional on received signals. Then
iterated elimination of dominated strategies starts.
^ z ¸ z z¤ z z
Figure II
If a ¯rm observes a signal close to one of the dominance regions there is a substantial
probability that some other ¯rms received a signal in the dominance region and therefore
have a dominant strategy. This is enough to ensure that the ¯rm itself has a dominant
strategy, too. Iterating this process starting from both dominance regions eventually results








[¼(®(z)) ¡ C(z)]dz = 0
captures that at the threshold z? the expected pro¯t from investing has to equal 0, the pro¯t
from not investing. Thereby the threshold is implicitly de¯ned. This ¯nding is captured in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique threshold z? where a ¯rm with zi < z? invests and a
¯rm with zi ¸ z? does not invest.
9Proof The proof can be found in the appendix.
Note that the expected pro¯t from investing - and therefore the equilibrium threshold z?
- depends on the precision ² of the private signal.
By applying the Global Games Approach we get rid of the multiplicity of equilibria and
can make unambiguous predictions for the outcome of the game, i.e. the industrialization
process. This outcome depends on the underlying quality of the country and on the precision
of the private signal. Although that might be interesting from a theoretical point of view so
far we have not gained much from a policy point of view. But fortunately we can do a bit
more.
4 Scope for Informational Policy
As pointed out earlier, the location of the threshold depends on the precision of the private
signal. In the following lemma we show that this dependence is locally monotonic.6
Lemma 2 In equilibrium it holds that @z?
@² < 0.
Proof The proof can be found in the appendix.
This lemma says that the location of the threshold depends on the precision of private
information. The precision of the private signals can be expressed by ². A higher ² means a
bigger support of the distribution of signals and therefore a higher variance. If ² decreases
the private signals get more precise and the threshold shifts to the right, i.e. for more values
of z it is now a dominant strategy to invest. From an ex ante perspective the probability of
industrialization increases7.
6Heinemann and Illing (2002) make a similar argument within the Morris and Shin (1998) framework. In
their model a central bank tries to minimize the risk of a speculative attack on a currency.
7This feature does not always carry over to general informational structures. Morris and Shin (2003)
discuss problems with normally distributed states and errors.
10This opens up scope for informational policy. We argue that an increase in the precision of
the signal can be interpreted as a more transparent regime. If more and better data are made
available, if the sources of this information are easily comprehensible, or if the information
is validated by an independent third party, the precision of the private signals, generated on
basis of these data, increases.
But this implies that a country can make up for inferior innate quality by a superior
information policy, i.e. by providing more precise information. To illustrate this consider
two countries A and B where A's investment environment is slightly worse. If A now pro-
vides su±ciently better information { in terms of precision { it is more likely for A to be
industrialized than for B. This is captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Su±ciently more precise information policy can compensate for innate dis-
advantages in a country's investment environment.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 2.
This now gives scope for an additional policy instrument. To reach a more e±cient situa-
tion a country no longer has to rely only on undi®erentiated subsidies or direct coordinating
intervention, but informational policy can be used to increase e±ciency.
5 Extensions and Discussion
5.1 Credibility of Information
We have shown that informational policy can be used to enhance e±ciency. But the question
arises how that policy should be performed and who should provide this information. The
straightforward answer seems to be national governments. But one can easily argue that
these governments have misguided incentives. They may strictly prefer their country to be
industrialized, either for benevolent reasons as raising standards of living or for the fact that
11they can collect bribes or taxes from industries. Therefore they may provide biased, i.e. too
positive, information in order to attract investors.
There are two possible ways of doing this. On the one hand a country can simply withhold
disadvantageous information and it may well be impossible to observe whether or not infor-
mation has been withheld. On the other hand it may be possible to simply make up good
news without the possibility of this window dressing being exposed. Therefore credibility of
information is a serious problem here8.
One approach could be to rely on external bodies to provide this information. External
bodies are institutions that have no such credibility problems as national governments. One
could think of the World Bank, the UN or the IMF as such institutions. Another approach
could be to resort to market institutions like rating agencies in ¯nancial markets. These
companies make their money from their reputation of providing reliable information. Indeed
such institutions exist and o®er very detailed information on numerous variables such as
political stability or the quality of the judicial system. The \Economist Intelligence Unit"9
or the \International Country Risk Guide"10 are only two examples.
An economic theorist however might resort to another solution to this credibility problem.
If countries can at some cost signal their true investment environment (and if these countries
di®er systematically with respect to their costs of signalling) it would be possible to separate
countries according to quality.
Subsidies are such an instrument. The 'better' a country the more likely it is that this
country is able to recoup the subsidies over time through taxing the ¯rms' pro¯ts or higher
tax revenues in the whole economy. Reversely, the worse the environment in a country, the
less likely it is to recoup these subsidies, i.e. the more costly it is for a 'bad' country to
mimic a 'good' country by o®ering generous subsidy schemes to investing ¯rms. Along this
line of reasoning it is possible to explain observed subsidies not as ad hoc policy instruments
8Milgrom (1981) has shown that this is not the case if the only way of lying is to omit negative infor-
mation and agents can observe omittance. By holding very pessimistic beliefs upon observing omittance in
equilibrium all relevant information is revealed. However, generally the environment here is more hostile.
9http://www.eiu.com/
10http://www.icrgonline.com/
12but as an equilibrium property of a signalling equilibrium11.
Some people might argue that it is not at all clear that bodies like the World Bank have
the right incentives to provide unbiased information. In this context one could interpret
World Bank loans as a costly signal of a country's quality, too. If one talks to practitioners
in the ¯eld and follows the political discussion this signal character of World Bank loans or
IMF programs seems to be one important feature of these credits or programs respectively.
In a similar manner to subsidies we can also think of other forms of public spending,
e.g. infrastructure projects, serving as costly signals. Keefer and Knack (2002) empiri-
cally support this thesis and argue that public spending is increased to attract investors to
unattractive countries. Similar to us they deem countries with insecure property rights to
be unattractive.
5.2 Dynamic Structure and Heterogeneity
Suppose there are many small investors and one big investor. A big investor could be
interpreted as a ¯rm industrializing a key sector of the economy and having a relatively
large impact on marginal pro¯ts of other, smaller, ¯rms12. One interpretation would be to
view the big investor as a private ¯rm providing infrastructure like railways or electricity, via
this channel having a big impact on other ¯rms' pro¯ts. Reading the model that way would
deliver infrastructure as an equilibrium property. One can show that the very presence of
such a big investor makes the small investors more inclined to invest13.
In our terminology one could phrase it such that the small investors now invest given
worse investment environments than they did without the big investor. If one also takes
into account that big and small investors might be di®erently informed one gains further
insights. If the large investor is better informed { and if that is common knowledge {
the above mentioned e®ect is strengthened. If we moreover allow for a dynamic structure
11See for example Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2003) for an analysis of costly signalling in a model of
¯nancial crisis.
12Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) have analyzed a similar model in a currency crises setup.
13Cf. Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004).
13where the big player's decision to invest or not is publicly observable the e®ects are further
strengthened as the small investors now can be sure that a substantial investment already
has been made.
Again, this bears policy implications. Key investors should be the ¯rst to be given access
to information and this should be made public. Also one should aim to get key investors
to decide ¯rst and make these decisions as public as possible. Again subsidies for such key
sectors could be a viable instrument and such things are indeed quite commonly observed.
5.3 Additional Signals
We could also allow for a richer information structure. Each ¯rm observes not only a private
signal but also a public signal14. It can be shown that ¯rms react stronger to the public signal
than its precision would suggest. But this type of 'over reaction' can be easily rationalized.
A public signal triggers two e®ects. On the one hand it conveys information as a private
signal does, on the other hand it has a 'coordination e®ect' as everybody now knows some-
thing about other players' information and can infer about other players' dominant strategies.
It is the latter coordination e®ect that triggers the 'over reaction' to public signals.
This, too, could be used as a policy instrument. Revealing information publicly can en-
hance e±ciency. And the 'over reaction' gives a high leverage to this instrument. However,
this e®ect can be dangerous as well. Even if the provided public signals are not very informa-
tive they can have large e®ects. So just by creating 'noise' one might trigger large reactions.
Therefore it is important to be careful when releasing public information.
This reasoning in principle delivers testable predictions. For example, the 1994 Mexican
Tequila crisis or the 1997 Asian crisis could be interpreted as signals that 'investments in
emerging/developing markets are not without risk'. Although these signals have not much
informational value we would, due to a 'coordination e®ect', expect a drop in investments
in other emerging or developing countries in the aftermath of these crises, even if they were
14This situation was ¯rst studied by Morris and Shin [2002].
14not a®ected by the original crises.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze how to deal with multiple equilibria inherent in the industrialization
process of countries. We augment the existing literature on investment complementarities
with an additional variable, the investment environment in a country. To this somewhat
richer model we apply the Global Games Approach. Thereby we are able to eliminate the
multiplicity of equilibria and end up with a unique equilibrium prediction dependent on
the investment environment of the country. We show how the right information provision,
namely more precise private signals, can enhance e±ciency and we argue that subsidies may
be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in the provision of
information. Finally, we point at possible problems with overreaction to public information
and suggest a sequence for the industrialization process.
The recent ¯nding by Jones and Olken (2005) that there are leader ¯xed e®ects in countries'
growth patterns can be also interpreted in the light of our approach. A change in leadership
can change the equilibrium as the new leader may have some - in their study - unobserved
characteristics, e.g. being credible, that change the information structure. Rodrik, Gross-
man, and Norman (1995) argue that credibility and determination of the leadership in South
Korea and Taiwan were important ingredients for these countries' success.
Although we think one has to be careful to use the model directly as sole basis for policy
advice, we ¯rmly belief that information plays a non trivial role in the industrialization
process. We believe that a lot can be gained if development policy would pay attention to
this.
Our paper can be seen as an additional argument that providing an appropriate investment
environment should be the focus of development policy. And if we need subsidizing, it has
to be the right kind of subsidies { informative ones.
157 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof follows the logic in Morris and Shin (1998). The pro¯t of ¯rm i depends
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1 if zi · k
0 if zi > k
:
If each player plays such a switching strategy Ik then the expected pro¯t of an investing




j · k j z
i) + ¼(0)prob(z
j > k j z
i) ¡ E[C(z) j z
i]: (5)
For the next step of the proof it is necessary to show that ¦(zi;Ik) is strictly increasing in
zi. This can be done in the following way:
First we can write (5) as
¦
i(z
i;Ik) = (¼(1) ¡ ¼(0))prob(z
j · k j z
i) + ¼(0) ¡ E[C(z) j z
i]: (6)
Since E[zj j zi] = zi and zj is triangular distributed on [zi ¡ 2²;zi + 2²] we have





= 0 if k < zi ¡ 2² and k > zi + 2²
< 0 if zi ¡ 2² · k · zi + 2²:
Since
@(¼(1)¡¼(0))
@zi = 0 the ¯rst term of (6) is weakly decreasing in zi. It also holds that
@E[C(z) j zi]
@zi > 0 8z
i:
16Thus the third term of (6) is strictly decreasing in zi and therefore ¦(zi;Ik) is strictly
decreasing in zi.
We can now start with the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We know
from our assumptions that there must be signals z0 and ¹ z0 with
E[¼(0) ¡ C(z) j z0] = 0 E[¼(1) ¡ C(z) j ¹ z0] = 0:
Because of ¦(zi;Ik) strictly decreasing in zi there exists signals z1 ¸ z0 and ¹ z1 · ¹ z0, such
that
¦(z;Iz0) > 0 8z < z1 and ¦(z;I¹ z0) < 0 8z > ¹ z1:
Moreover,
¦(z1;Iz0) = 0 and ¦(¹ z1;I¹ z0) = 0:
We can apply iterative elimination further and since the convergence (zn)n2N is increasing
and (¹ zn)n2N is decreasing there exist limit values z? = limn!1zn and ¹ z? = limn!1¹ zn. For
these values it holds that
z
? = minfz j ¦(z;Iz) = 0g and ¹ z
? = maxfz j ¦(z;Iz) = 0g:
The values z? and ¹ z? are the lowest and the highest solution of the equation ¦(z;Iz) = 0.





?) + ¼(0) ¡ E[C(z) j z
i = z
?] = 0: (7)
zj j zi is triangular distributed between (zi ¡ 2²;zi + 2²) and therefore prob(zj · z? j zi =
z?) = 1
2. Thus (7) can then be written as
¼(1) ¡ ¼(0) = 2E[C(z) j z
i = z
?] (8)
The left hand side of (8) is constant while the right hand side is strictly decreasing. Therefore
it exists a unique value of z?.
177.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof follows the logic in Heinemann and Illing (2002). The unique equilibrium








z?¡² ¼(1)dz + 1
2²
R z?+²








z?¡² C(z)dz = 0:
(9)











? + ²) + C(z






Rearranging terms and using 1
²
R z?+²




¼(1) + ¼(0) ¡ [C(z? + ²) + C(z? ¡ ²)]
C(z? + ²) ¡ C(z? ¡ ²)
: (10)
The denominator of (10) is positive. To determine the sign of dz?
d² we need to determine the









z?¡² C(z)dz because C(¢) is a strictly increasing function. Adding up the left hand
sides of the last two inequalities and dividing by 2 gives ²[C(z? +²)+C(z? ¡²)]. Adding up
the two right hand sides and dividing by 2 gives
R z?+²
z?¡² C(z)dz. But since C(¢) is a convex
function we have
²[C(z
? + ²) + C(z







z?¡² C(z)dz = ¼(1) + ¼(0) we have established that
¼(1) + ¼(0) < C(z
? + ²) + C(z
? ¡ ²):
Thus, the numerator of (10) is negative which proves that dz?
d² < 0.
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